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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the transitional justice dilemma from a 
constitutional perspective and has the purpose to understand 
how the Colombian constitutional framework could respond to 
a transitional process, in particular, with regard to the issue of 
criminal accountability for the perpetrators of atrocities during the 
armed conflict in a process of negotiation addressed to achieve 
peace and reconciliation. In other words, the present exercise is 
focused on which constitutional mechanisms are provided by the 
Colombian Constitution to resolve the conflict generated during 
a transitional process between the right to peace and to justice, 
how those mechanisms shall be interpreted, and what are the 
implications of each of them.
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El marco constitucional vigente de la justicia transicional  
en Colombia
RESUMEN
El artículo aborda el dilema de la justicia transicional desde la 
perspectiva del derecho constitucional vigente en Colombia. El 
propósito es presentar cómo dicho marco constitucional puede 
responder a la aplicación de la justicia transicional, en especial en 
relación con el problema de la responsabilidad penal de quienes 
cometieron atrocidades durante el conflicto armado, dentro de un 
proceso de diálogo y negociación. En otras palabras, el presente 
escrito está enfocado en presentar cuáles son los mecanismos 
previstos en la Constitución colombiana para resolver la tensión 
generada entre el derecho a la paz y a la justicia en un proceso 
transicional, cómo deben ser interpretados y cuáles son las 
implicaciones de sus usos. 
Palabras clave: Constitución de Colombia, Justicia Transicional, Am-
nistías, Indultos, Bloque de Constitucionalidad. 
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INTRODUCTION
Colombia is currently immersed in an 
armed conflict of non-international char-
acter that has been ongoing for more than 
fifty years, which is one of the longest 
ongoing conflicts in the world (Guzman, 
Sánchez & Uprimny, 2010). This conflict 
is between insurgent groups and the 
Government of Colombia. As one would 
expect, the duration and the continuity 
of the conflict has generated a dramatic 
scenario in terms of the loss of human 
life and the suffering of awful atrocities. 
According to Amnesty International, in 
the last 20 years, at least 70,000 people 
have lost their lives due to the conflict 
(Amnesty International, 2004). The num-
ber of displaced people is estimated at 
3.5 million, and the number of victims of 
sexual violence is currently recorded as 
33,960 (OXFAM international, 2011) The 
Colombian government is now estimating 
the number of direct victims of the armed 
conflict in millions (Santos-Calderon, 
2011). It is reasonable to conclude that 
the situation in Colombia could be one 
of the most dramatic humanitarian crises 
in the world, especially when considering 
that the number of deaths and victims are 
continually growing.
Recently, a new effort to achieve peace 
has commenced. A peace negotiation 
process is taking place between the 
Government and the guerrilla of FARC 
in La Havana, Cuba. One of the most 
difficult issues during this negotiation 
will certainly be the accountability of the 
atrocities committed during the conflict 
and the effective recognition of the rights 
of the victims. The divergence between 
the parties in the negotiation process is 
clear. On the one hand, the FARC negotia-
tors have argued that before they could be 
considered as perpetrators of any crime, 
they must be recognized as victims of the 
State and repair it as such. On the other 
hand, the government has argued that 
the first step in the negotiation must be 
the FARC’s recognition of their victims 
and agreement that impunity will not be 
allowed for the atrocities committed.
For the discipline of transitional justice 
these issues are not new. In any tran-
sitional process, the accountability of 
the perpetrator for systematic and mass 
crimes has been one of the most com-
plex topics because “the traumatization 
caused by widespread past atrocities does 
not end when the guns [hopefully] fall 
silent” (Stromseth, Wippman & Brooks, 
2006). Thus, in the doctrine of transitional 
justice this is now a classic dilemma be-
tween peace and justice. On one side, 
the defenders of peace argue in favor of 
moving forward and promoting the idea 
of amnesties and clemency for the parties 
in conflict as a way to achieve reconcilia-
tion. On the other side, the defenders of 
justice promote full accountability for all 
perpetrators of crimes during the conflict 
as a way to repair the victims and ensure 
that such abuses will not be permitted to 
recur (Lutz & Sikkink, 2001).
From a comparative perspective, none 
of those extreme positions seem conve-
nient or even possible as an answer to 
this classic transitional justice dilemma. 
In one way because the advancement of 
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the international human rights law tends, 
each day harder, to prohibit the possibil-
ity to concede absolute amnesties for the 
perpetrators, to the most serious crimes, 
including, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes (Mendez, 2011). In the other 
way, in scenarios of widespread atrocities 
and long duration conflicts as Colombia 
it is just naïve to conceive the possibility 
to investigate and punish any illegal act 
committed and also a bad strategy in the 
ideal to achieve a negotiated peace. 
However, Colombia is organized as a 
constitutional democracy, and under the 
supremacy of the Constitution the exer-
cise of the political power is and should 
be limited by the constitutional mandates 
(Sartori, 1962). Any act or decision of a 
public authority must conform to the con-
tent of the Constitution. In other words, 
any public choice must be, firstly, taken 
by the competent authority and by the 
adequate procedure according to the divi-
sion of powers made in the Constitution; 
and secondly, must respect in a reasonable 
and proportional sense the constitutional 
rights recognized to all citizens. In this 
sense, the decision about the transitional 
dilemma is not only a political question; 
it is also a constitutional matter as long 
as the Constitution remains unmodified 
and in force. Therefore, the legality and 
legitimacy of any public decision, includ-
ing about the criminal liability for the acts 
committed during the conflict, will depend 
on the compliance that this choice has 
with the Constitution (Fallon, 2005).
This paper analyzes the transitional 
justice dilemma from a constitutional 
perspective and has the purpose to 
understand how the Colombian consti-
tutional framework could respond to a 
transitional process, in particular, with 
regard to the issue of criminal account-
ability for the perpetrators of crimes 
during the armed conflict in a process of 
negotiation addressed to achieve peace 
and reconciliation. In other words, the 
present exercise is focused on which con-
stitutional mechanisms are provided by 
the Colombian Constitution to resolve the 
conflict generated during a transitional 
process between the right to peace and 
to justice, how those mechanisms shall be 
interpreted, and what are the implications 
of each of them.
With this purpose in mind, the first sec-
tion will present the norms and disposi-
tions that compose the constitutional 
framework of transitional justice. Doing 
so, it will start with the scope and meaning 
of the rights to peace and to justice. Then, 
will be presented the three mechanisms 
provided in the Constitution to solve the 
possible tension between both rights in a 
transitional context. The second section 
of this paper will be focused on how the 
jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court has interpreted and decided 
cases related to the use of transitional 
mechanism as the authorized interpreter 
and guard of the Constitution. This will 
require a review of the landmark decisions 
that the Court has made in this regard; 
firstly, about the constitutionality of the 
International Criminal Court Statute; 
secondly, about the constitutionality of 
some legal restriction to the power to 
grant amnesties; and thirdly, about the 
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revision of the “Justice and Peace” Law.
In the third section, this paper will present 
some international instruments, decisions 
and materials that, in virtue of article 93 of 
the Constitution, have become an active 
part of the Constitution, and therefore, 
must be taken into account for a system-
atic interpretation of any constitutional 
institution. In this sense, it will be revised 
some norms and decisions made referring 
to transitional justice from the Universal 
System for Protection of Human Rights 
and the Inter- American System of Hu-
man Rights. 
1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
1.1 The right to peace and to access to justice in 
the Colombian Constitution 
Before 1991, the previous Colombian Con-
stitutions could be considered as “Battle 
Charts” rather than truly constitutional 
agreements. As Professor Hernando 
Valencia-Villa held, those charters were 
created and imposed exclusively by the 
winning party of previous political or 
armed struggles at the exclusion of the 
losers (Valencia-Villa, 2012). In this trend, 
the Colombian Constitution of 1991 is 
an exception due to the participatory, 
pluralistic and democratic process that 
preceded it (Cepeda-Espinosa, 2004).  
Indeed, the Colombian Constitution of 
1991 was conceived as a peace agreement 
itself among different and even antagonist 
political and social movements including 
some insurgent groups (Valencia-Villa, 
2012). Therefore, peace occupies a fun-
damental place in the Constitution. For 
instance, the Preamble invokes peace as 
one of the national purposes:
In the exercise of their sovereign 
power represented by their dele-
gates to the national Constituent 
Assembly, invoking the protection 
of God, and in order to strengthen 
the unity of the nation and ensure 
its members life, peaceful coex-
istence, work, justice, equality, 
knowledge, freedom, and peace 
within a legal, democratic, and 
participatory framework that may 
guarantee a just political, eco-
nomic, and social order and com-
mitted to promote the integration 
of the Latin American community 
(Republic of Colombia, 1991).
Similarly, article 2 of the Constitution 
also defined “peaceful coexistence” as 
an essential objective of the Colombian 
State.  As a result of those ideals, the 
Constitution then includes the right to 
peace, establishing explicitly in article 22 
that “Peace is a right and a duty whose 
compliance is mandatory”. From this con-
tent, and according to the jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court (Colombian 
Constitutional Court, 2006A), it is pos-
sible to hold that (i) peace is a “collective 
right” whose entitlement belongs to the 
Colombian people as a Third Generation 
Human Right; (ii) peace is a subjective 
and fundamental right whose entitlement 
belongs to any Colombian citizen; and (iii) 
peace is also a civic and institutional duty 
aimed at the achievement and mainte-
nance of peace in accordance with article 
95 of the Constitution. 
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Hence, peace must be considered as a 
fundamental value in the Colombian Con-
stitutional that shall irradiate the content 
and purpose of the Colombian legal sys-
tem and political institutions. Therefore, 
any Colombian citizen has the right to live 
in peaceful coexistence, harmony, and 
free from the use of arbitrary violence to 
solve any dispute. Simultaneously, both 
citizens and public institutions have the 
correlative duty to guarantee the neces-
sary conditions to achieve peace in any 
time and with any actuation. 
The Colombian Constitution also includes 
the right to a judicial remedy. Article 229 
explicitly establishes, “The right of any 
person to have access to the administra-
tion of justice is guaranteed”. The consti-
tutional jurisprudence has distinguished 
between two dimensions of this right: (i) 
any citizen has the power to access the 
judicial system; therefore, the judicial 
authorities have the duty to receive and 
to process the claims and demands pre-
sented by all citizens; and (ii) all citizens 
have the right that their claims must be 
adequately and timely resolved by the 
judicial authorities. The State, through 
the judicial system, must adhere to both 
dimensions of the right for all Colombian 
citizens (Colombian Constitutional Court, 
2011).
When any citizen becomes a victim of a 
criminal conduct, the right to a judicial 
remedy acquires a wider scope. The rights 
of victims have constitutional relevance. 
On one side, article 250 of the Constitu-
tion states a duty of the State, through the 
General Attorney Office [Fiscalía General de 
la Nación], being to guarantee assistance 
for the victims, the restoration of their 
rights, and the integral reparation of the 
damage caused. Also, the duties to guar-
antee the protection of the victims, the 
opportunity to intervene in the criminal 
procedure, and the existence of restor-
ative justice mechanisms are guaranteed 
in the same article. Furthermore, the 
Constitution determines the obligation 
of the public authorities, in particular to 
the judicial ones, to tend to the effective 
enjoyment of the rights of all residents 
in Colombia and to bring them the legal 
protection that they require to ensure 
peaceful coexistence and the enforce-
ment of a just order.  
As a consequence of the internal armed 
conflict, a significant and an increasing 
number of Colombian citizens have be-
come victims of the most horrible crimes, 
including war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The Constitutional Court de-
termined that the victims of the internal 
armed conflict represent one of the most 
vulnerable sectors in society and, for the 
most cases, are in a situation of extreme 
vulnerability. As a response to the mas-
sive violation of their constitutional rights, 
the Court declared the status of “subjects 
of special constitutional protection” to 
the victims of the armed conflict. In this 
regard, the Court held, “[...] the victims of 
violence in an internal armed conflict are 
in a situation of extreme vulnerability and, 
as such, require special treatment by the 
public authorities, which should provide 
the help needed to recover their minimum 
subsistence and rights”  (Colombian Con-
stitutional Court, 2007).
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In response to this situation, the Colom-
bian Congress has developed constitu-
tional mandates and has enacted some 
legislation about the particular rights 
of the victims of the armed conflict. For 
instance, Act number 975 of 2005, also 
called the “peace and justice law”, was 
enacted with the purpose of facilitating 
the peace process with the paramilitary 
groups and their reincorporation to the 
civilian life, but ensuring the rights of the 
victims to truth, justice, reparation and 
non-repetition. (Colombian National Con-
gress, 2005) This law explicitly provides 
the right to justice:
The State has a duty to conduct 
an effective investigation leading 
to the identification, arrest and 
punishment of those responsible 
for crimes committed by mem-
bers of armed groups outside the 
law to ensure the victim’s welfare 
through the access to effective 
remedies to repair the damage 
done, and take all measures to 
avoid the recurrence of such 
violations […]
This law thus places special attention on 
the rights of victims regarding the admin-
istration of justice. Article 37 states the 
particular rights of the victims in a judicial 
process as being; (i) dignified and humane 
treatment; (ii) protection and privacy, in-
cluding their families and witnesses; (iii) 
prompt and comprehensive reparation of 
the damage caused by the perpetrator or 
accomplice of the crime; (iv) to be heard 
and to be allowed to provide evidence to 
the prosecution; (v) to know the truth of 
the facts that caused the circumstances 
of the crime of which they were victim; 
(vi) to be informed about the final deci-
sion of the prosecution and to use the 
court actions when it is possible; (vii) to 
be assisted during the trial by a trusted 
attorney; (viii) to receive assistance aimed 
to their full recovery; and(ix) to be as-
sisted without charge by a translator or 
interpreter in the event of not knowing 
the language of the prosecution. All these 
legislative dispositions, as will be pre-
sented later, were declared in accordance 
with the Constitution by the Colombian 
Constitutional Court (2006A). 
Summarizing, the Constitution estab-
lished the right to justice for any Co-
lombian citizen. This right is reinforced 
when the citizen becomes a victim of a 
crime, especially in the context of the 
armed conflict. In this situation, the State, 
through the judicial system, has the duty 
to avoid impunity and thus guarantee the 
right to truth, reparation, non-repetition 
and justice for the victims. As part of 
the right to justice, the State has the 
particular duty to investigate, prosecute 
and punish the perpetrator of the crime. 
1.2  The power to concede amnesties laws accord-
ing to the Constitution
As was said, the rights to peace and to 
justice are likely to collide in a transitional 
scenario. On the one side, the right to 
peace would suggest policies of pardon 
and forgiveness for the past conducts as 
a strategy to achieve the demobilization 
of the parties in conflict and in favor of 
reconciliation. On the other, the right to 
justice would avoid any possibility of im-
punity and, therefore, demands the inves-
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tigation, prosecution and punishment of 
any unlawful conduct committed. Those 
kinds of conflicts between rights are com-
mon to the practice of constitutional law 
and under the premise that no constitu-
tional right is absolute. Some limitations 
and restrictions are allowed to them in 
these collisions. Precisely, the idea of 
transitional justice starts admitting the 
existence of an inherent tension between 
both rights, and from there explores a full 
range of processes and mechanisms to 
ensure some accountability and to serve 
justice, but also to achieve reconciliation 
in the best way possible. 
Taking into account the own history of the 
Constitution, the Constituent foresaw this 
tension between the right to peace and to 
justice in the future transitional process 
and arranged three constitutional mecha-
nisms to settle it. The first mechanism 
chosen was through the power granted 
to Congress to concede amnesties for 
some crimes. According to article 150.17 
of the Constitution the Congress is able 
by law to “Grant by a two-thirds majority 
of the votes of the members of one and 
the other chamber and for serious rea-
sons of public convenience, amnesties for 
political crimes.” From this disposition, it 
is possible to hold that: (i) the National 
Congress is the only public organ that 
can concede amnesties; (ii) the decision 
corresponds to a qualified majority of two 
thirds of the members of the Senate and 
the Chamber of Representatives; (iii) the 
decision must be justified on motives of 
“public convenience”; and (iv) the crimes 
subject to this special treatment are re-
stricted to “political crimes”. 
An amnesty has the effect to extinguish 
the ius puniendi, meaning the right to pun-
ish by the State and thus implies that the 
“State forgives the crime” (Colombian 
Constitutional Court, 2006A). In a prac-
tical sense, an amnesty law could have 
three different manifestations. Firstly, 
it prevents the beginning of any future 
criminal investigations or prosecutions 
for the crimes and individuals benefited 
with this law. Secondly, it precludes any in-
vestigation or prosecution that is already 
opened for the crimes and individuals 
benefited with this law. Thirdly, if at the 
moment when the amnesty is granted 
some individuals are already condemned, 
those sentences must be cancelled and 
any penalty lifted. Taking into account 
that those three situations refer to the 
exercise of the ius puniendi, in all cases this 
law will be required subsequent actua-
tion by the judicial authorities who must 
apply it to each judicial case (Colombian 
Constitutional Court, 2005A).  
One of the most troubling issues about 
this mechanism is the definition of the 
crimes that could be subject to amnesties. 
Although the Constitution established 
that these measures only proceed for 
“political crimes”, its definition and the 
possibility to include “connected crimes” 
are not regulated in it. Therefore, this is-
sue has to be defined initially by the politi-
cal organs and then by the constitutional 
judge. Since 1991 until today, no amnesty 
law has been formally enacted invoking 
the power granted on article 150.17 of the 
Constitution and, therefore, there is no 
legal precedent on this matter.
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The level of affectation that this mecha-
nism has over the right to justice of the 
victims is high, particularly in the sense 
that it prevents even the start of future 
investigations and prosecutions, and 
therefore, any possibility of any judicial 
punishment. In doing so, the rights to 
a judicial truth, the participation of the 
victims in the judicial process and the 
judicial punishment will all be affected. 
In a practical way, the duty to investigate, 
prosecute and punish by the State will be 
suspended for the cases and individuals 
subject to the amnesty in detriment of 
the right to justice of the victims under 
the argument of achieving peace.  
1.3  The power to grant pardons by the executive 
branch according to the Constitution
The second transitional mechanism pro-
vided in the Constitution refers to the 
powers to grant pardons by the executive 
branch represented by the President of 
the Republic. According to article 201.2 
of the Constitution, the government has 
the power to grant pardons for political 
crimes in the way that the law establishes 
it. The reprieve or pardon is an institution 
that redeems a judicial penalty or sanc-
tion, meaning that the State does not 
forgive the commission of the crimes, only 
their legal consequence. This idea implies 
that the pardon requires that a judicial 
process and a legal sanction already ex-
ist against a person and, therefore, is a 
particular and concrete action. Constitu-
tionally, this power belongs to the execu-
tive branch because technically, when a 
judicial prosecution ends, and there is an 
enforceable condemn, the competence of 
the judicial branch is exhausted and thus 
it is competence of the executive branch 
the enforcement of the sanction itself.  
In this reasoning, the differences between 
amnesty and pardon is that the first sup-
poses the oblivion of the crime commit-
ted, legally the extinction of the criminal 
action, and thus is general and abstract; 
but the pardon is the reprieve of the sanc-
tion already imposed by the judicature 
for the commission of a crime and is a 
particular and a concrete act. Both cases 
are examples of grounds for the early 
termination of a criminal prosecution; 
both proceed only for political crimes, 
and both correspond to transitional 
mechanisms (Colombian Constitutional 
Court, 2006B).
For instance, in 2002 the National Con-
gress enacted the Law Number 782, which 
regulated the power of the President 
to grant pardons. In this regard the law 
states,  
The National Government could 
concede, in each particular case, 
the benefit of reprieve to the 
nationals who were convicted 
by an enforceable sentence for 
conducts that constitute political 
crimes when in its judgment the 
illegal armed group of the appli-
cant has demonstrated its willing-
ness to rejoin civilian life.[…]
Those dispositions do not apply to who 
committed conducts constituting atro-
cious acts, ferocity, barbarism, terrorism, 
hijacking or murder committed outside 
combat or placing the victim in a helpless 
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situation. As this legal disposition shows 
the reprieve, first, it is a privilege or faculty 
of the government represented by the 
President; second, it uses a case by case 
methodology; third, it applies only for 
political crimes and “connected” crimes; 
fourth, the nature of the “connected” 
crimes could have some restriction due 
to the seriousness of the conducts.; and 
fifth, it is a transitional mechanism based 
on the consecution of peace and the re-
incorporation to the civilian life.
The level of affectation that this mecha-
nism has over the right to justice of the 
victims is less than the mechanism of 
granting amnesties. This is because, in 
a reprieve, the judicial process is already 
finished, the judicial truth is already 
achieved, the responsibility of the defen-
dant is established, and even the convic-
tion is now proffered. In this sense, the 
restriction of the right to justice is only 
about the effective enforcement of the 
judgment, which is one of the components 
of the right to justice of the victims.  
1.4  The “legal framework for peace” in the 
Colombian Constitution
The third mechanism provided in the Con-
stitution to settle the eventual collision 
between the right to peace and to justice 
in the context of a transitional process is 
more recent. This mechanism was created 
by a constitutional reform enacted by the 
Congress in 2012.This reform was called as 
“The legal framework for peace” because, 
for their authors, the main objective was, 
“[T]o establish a Constitutional frame-
work for the strategy of the transitional 
justice that facilitates in the future the 
achievement of a stable and long lasting 
peace” (Colombian National Congress, 
2012). However, this future tense was not 
so real. Today it is well known that this 
reform corresponded to a strategy of the 
Government to extend its legal maneuver-
ability in the secret negotiations that was 
ongoing at that time with the guerrilla of 
FARC. This process continues today. 
From a legal perspective, this reform sup-
posed the inclusion of two provisional 
articles to the Constitution, number 66 
and 67. Although the Congress has not 
developed those constitutional articles, 
from the content of both norms, it is pos-
sible to hold that the mechanism created 
by the reform implies, inter alia: (i) the 
possibility to establish by the Congress 
in further norms extra- judicial mecha-
nisms of investigation and sanction for 
crimes committed during the conflict; 
(ii) the criteria of “prioritization” and “se-
lection” to decide which crimes will be 
investigated, prosecuted and punished 
judicially from the universe of crimes 
committed during the armed conflict; (iii) 
the possibility to suspend or to alternate 
with extra- judicial sanctions the execu-
tion of the convictions, even for crimes 
prioritized and selected; and (iv) the ces-
sation of the criminal prosecution to the 
responsible for cases non- prioritized or 
non- selected.
In terms of rights, this third transitional 
mechanism established that the right 
to justice, understood as the duty to 
investigate, prosecute and punish by the 
State, is suspended indefinitely for the 
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conducts that will be non- prioritized or 
non- selected. In these two cases, the 
practical effect will be the renounce of 
the State to prosecute and punish the 
commission of those crimes by judicial 
mechanisms, which in fact is the same as 
the effects of an amnesty law. Therefore, 
it will depend on the scope of the criteria 
of prioritization and selection the number 
of conducts and perpetrators that will 
benefit from this measure in detriment 
of the right to justice of the victims. For 
instance, if the crimes selected will only 
be the conducts that acquire the connota-
tion of crimes against humanity, genocide 
and war crimes committed systematically 
as the content of the article seems to 
suggest, any member of the FARC will be 
condemned because as the General At-
torney said no member of the FARC have 
any conviction for these kinds of crimes 
(El Tiempo, April 12 of 2013). In conse-
quence, due to the implications that the 
developments of this mechanism will have 
on the rights of victims, especially in the 
right to justice, the Congress and further 
the constitutional judge shall make a care-
ful balancing between the constitutional 
rights and principle involved to settle the 
tension between peace and justice in a 
transitional context. 
2.  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT ABOUT TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
The Colombian Constitution establishes 
in article 241 that the Constitutional 
Court is the ultimate guardian of integrity 
and supremacy of the Constitution. The 
jurisprudence of the Court is a relevant 
criterion for the interpretation of the con-
stitutional dispositions. Therefore, in this 
section will be analyzed some decisions 
in which the Constitutional Court has ad-
dressed the issues related with the institu-
tions mentioned in the previous section 
and from there, some conclusions will be 
extracted about how those institutions 
shall be interpreted in future instances. 
2.1 Decision C-572 of 2002 about the constitution-
ality of the Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute)
The Colombian Congress enacted in 2001 
the Act Number 742 with the objective to 
ratify the international treaty that adopts 
the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court [hereinafter ICC] also known as the 
Rome Statute. According to the Colom-
bian Constitution, any law that ratifies an 
international treaty, still to be approved by 
the Congress and sanctioned by the Presi-
dent before it becomes enforced, requires 
the automatic and general control by the 
Constitutional Court. This control implies 
the formal and material revision of the 
law according to constitutional mandates 
and at the end decides if the new treaty 
is constitutional or not.  Therefore, by the 
Decision C-578 of 2002, the Constitutional 
Court revised the constitutionality of the 
Act 742 of 2001 in which the Statute of 
the ICC was adopted.  
In this Decision, the Court starts its analy-
sis by noting that the ICC was conceived 
as an instrument against impunity and 
thus to achieve the respect and the effec-
tiveness of human rights and International 
Humanitarian Law. In doing so, the ICC 
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complements the national judicial sys-
tems in the prosecution and punishment 
of the perpetrator of the most serious hu-
man rights or laws of war violations when 
the national courts are unwilling or unable 
to investigate and prosecute such crimes.
In consequence, for the Court it is clear 
that the functioning of the ICC implies 
a limitation of the national sovereignty 
because it will be the ICC who decides 
when any State is unwilling or unable 
to investigate and prosecute the crimes 
stated on the Statute. This limitation is 
adequate with the Constitution due to 
the constitutional principles and values 
that this ICC pursued. Hence, the Court 
established that any actuation addressed 
to subtract from the justice a perpetrator 
for crime enlisted in the Statute or the 
incapacity of the State to impart justice 
in those cases will be contrary not only 
to the Colombian Constitution but also 
to the international commitments binding 
for the country because both include the 
obligation to investigate and to punish 
grave violations of human rights and hu-
manitarian law (Colombian Constitutional 
Court, 2002A). 
Attending to the consequences of the 
reasoning above, the Court tries to 
“harmonize” this position with the con-
stitutional norms that allow granting 
amnesties or pardons for political crimes 
according to articles 150.17 and 201.2 of 
the Constitution. The Court held that any 
domestic instruments that would be use 
to achieve reconciliation must guarantee 
to the victims of any criminal conduct the 
possibility of access to justice, to know 
the truth and to obtain effective judicial 
protection. In the other way, if any law 
denies the right to a judicial remedy to 
the victims it will be a violation of the 
international duty of the States to provide 
effective judicial remedies for the protec-
tion of human rights. Therefore, the Court 
concludes by saying, 
Without prejudice about any 
eventual amnesty law, this Court 
does not find that the ratification 
of the Rome Statute could imply 
an obstacle for future peace and 
reconciliation processes that 
would consider measures like 
amnesties or judicial pardons if 
those follow the constitutional 
parameters and the principles 
and norms of international law 
binding for Colombia (Colombian 
Constitutional Court, 2002A).
From this conclusion, the Courts seems 
to accept that the power to grant amnes-
ties or pardons must in any case follow, 
first, the constitutional parameters, and 
second, the principles and norms of inter-
national law binding for Colombia. About 
the constitutional parameters, from the 
decision it is clear that those are not only 
the conditions stated in articles 150.17 
and 201.2 of the Constitution, but also, 
the rights involved, particularly the right 
to justice even in those cases. With regard 
to the international principles and norms, 
at least the Court made direct reference 
to the content of the Rome Statute, 
meaning that the amnesties and pardons 
have an explicit limit in the conducts 
listed and under the conditions of the 
ICC Statute. 
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2.2 Decision C-695 of 2002 about the constitu-
tionality of the exclusion of some crimes for 
amnesties.
By the Decision C-695 of 2002, the Con-
stitutional Court resolved a constitutional 
claim against an article of the Act Number 
733 of 2002 which establishes some mea-
sures to fight crime, particularly hijacking, 
terrorism and extortion. The disposition 
demanded was article 13, which states:
In any case the perpetrator or 
accomplices of the crimes of 
terrorism, hijacking, extortion, in 
whatever modality, could be sub-
ject to benefices with amnesties 
or judicial pardons, or could be 
consider as “connected” with po-
litical crimes due to its condition 
of atrocities (Colombian National 
Congress, 2002).
In a divided decision, the majority of the 
Court held the constitutionality that the 
article demanded. To support this deci-
sion, the majority focused its reasoning on 
three arguments. First, that the Congress 
has discretion to concede amnesties as 
long as those laws respect the limits es-
tablished on the Constitution. Second, 
that the constitutional restrictions for 
the Congress in this matter: (a) cannot 
grant amnesties for “common crimes”; 
(b) cannot prohibit the concession of 
amnesties for “political crimes”; (c) can 
extend amnesties or judicial pardons 
to “connected crimes” with the political 
crimes as long as this decision respond 
to criteria of reasonableness and equality; 
and (d) must respect the right to truth, 
justice and reparation to the victims of 
the crimes amnestied. Third, because the 
mentioned article does not violate any of 
these constitutional limits the disposi-
tion must be declared as constitutional 
(Colombian Constitutional Court, 2002B) 
Even more interesting than the Decision 
itself were the arguments presented by the 
Justices in their dissent and concurring 
opinions. Apparently the Court was not 
able to achieve an agreement in the de-
cision about whether the crimes listed in 
the article demanded could be consider as 
political crimes or “connected” with them 
in future amnesties laws. On one hand, a 
group of three Justices known for its con-
servative positions, held that crimes like 
terrorism, hijacking, extortion, but also, 
intentional homicide, enforced disappear-
ance and torture, cannot be consider as 
political crimes or “connected” because 
those conducts are incompatible with 
the conceptual, philosophical and legal 
definition of political crimes that arise 
from the Constitution and international 
instruments binding for Colombia. 
On the other hand, three other Justices 
expressed separately their position that 
not only crimes like terrorism, hijacking 
and extortion could be subject to amnes-
ties, but also any other crimes that the 
legislative branch decides in the future 
could. For these judges, the fact that the 
Constitution does not explicitly exclude 
any conduct for be subject to amnesty or 
general pardon makes that this decision 
remain exclusively in the power of Con-
gress, under the conditions established in 
article 150.17 of the Constitution.  In this 
reasoning, the right and value of peace 
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could prevail over the right to justice and 
over the duty to investigate and to pun-
ish by the State even for the most serious 
crimes. The three remaining Justices de-
cided not to address this particular issue 
because it was outside the subject of the 
present case.
The concurring opinion wrote by the for-
mer Justice Eduardo Montealegre Linett 
and whom today serves as the General 
Attorney is particularly interesting. Justice 
Montealegre argues that any interpreta-
tion of the Constitution should corre-
spond to the social and historical condi-
tions of the country. In any case, peace 
must be considered as the supreme extra-
legal value and any citizen or institution 
must address its actions to achieve this 
goal as the Constitution mandates. By this 
reasoning, if the Congress considers in 
the future that atrocities or crimes against 
humanity shall be subject to amnesty in 
order to achieve peace, the Constitution 
do not establish any obstacles for that 
except for compensation for the victims. 
With regard to the duty to investigate and 
to punish by the State, the former justice 
said that, in a reconciliation process, this 
duty, including the prison penalties, must 
be replaced by the repentance of the 
perpetrators. 
For this decision, and despite the diver-
gence of positions, the majority of the 
Court held that any amnesty law must 
respect the right to truth, justice and 
reparation to the victims of the crimes and 
perpetrators amnestied. In this sense, the 
duty of the State to investigate, prosecute 
and punish must be somehow articulated 
with the future amnesties to be constitu-
tional. However, criteria like differentiate 
to “common crimes” and the relevance 
of the rights affected, are significant to 
political branches when they decide to 
grant an amnesty or even a pardon. 
2.3 Decision C-370 and C-575 of 2006 about the 
constitutionality of the “Justice and Peace” Law
In 2004, the government of the President 
Alvaro Uribe- Vélez opened a process of 
peace negotiation with the paramilitary 
groups. After a year of negotiations, the 
Colombian Congress enacted the Law 
No. 975 of 2004, called as the “Justice 
and Peace” Law [JPL Hereinafter]. This law 
was conceived as a transitional framework 
to the demobilization of the members 
of those groups. The main features of 
JPL about the right to justice are: (i) use 
a fact- by- fact and case- by-case meth-
odology for all the crimes committed by 
the demobilized people; (ii) establish an 
alternative penalty, consistent in five to 
eight years in prison, for individuals who 
leave their illegal activities and bring an 
effective contribution to truth, justice, 
reparation, and non- repetition of the 
crimes committed without any consid-
eration for the nature or severity of the 
crimes committed; (iii) if any demobilized 
person does not fulfill with any of those 
conditions he or she must be expelled 
from the “Peace and Justice” program 
and will be prosecuted under the ordi-
nary jurisdiction and legislation; and (iv) 
the JPL regulates a special procedure 
and jurisdiction for the investigation and 
prosecution of the crimes committed by 
the demobilized people. 
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As was expected, this law generated huge 
controversy because it was seen by some 
people as a hidden way to grant impunity 
for the crimes committed by the para-
military groups. As part of this national 
debate, the entire JPL was deemed as 
unconstitutional before the Constitutional 
Court claiming that the content of the law 
violates the constitutional rights of the 
victims to justice, reparation and truth. In 
the Decisions C-370 and C-575 of 2006, 
the Constitutional Court held that JPL as 
a whole was in accordance with the Con-
stitution, however, declared some parts of 
the law un-constitutional and conditioned 
the interpretation of others.  
In its judgment, the Court established that 
JPL is an ordinary law regulating criminal 
proceedings and cannot be compared to 
a law granting amnesty or pardon because 
it does not prevent ongoing criminal pros-
ecutions from continuing and it does not 
eliminate penalties; rather, it grants juridi-
cal benefits in order to achieve peace. In 
this regard, the Court said, “the law does 
not establish the extinction of the crimi-
nal action in relation with the crimes that 
could be indict to the members of the 
armed groups that decide to be benefi-
ciaries of this norm, therefore, it is clear 
that the State does not decide by this law 
forgive the criminal actions committed” 
(Colombian Constitutional Court, 2006B).
The Court also established that the ben-
efit of an alternative punishment was con-
stitutional because it did not dispropor-
tionately affect the rights of the victims 
to truth, justice, reparation and non-rep-
etition. With regard to the right to justice, 
the Court considered that this right was 
preserved by the ordinary penalty in the 
case that the perpetrator would not fulfill 
its obligations with truth, reparation and 
non-repetition for the victims. Finally, the 
Constitutional Court emphasized that JPL 
is a law related to transitional justice and 
examined the content of the law in light 
of the rights to truth, justice, reparation 
and non-repetition. 
Although the Court considered that this 
law was not an amnesty, it could be high-
lighted first that the right of the victims 
to truth, justice, reparation were used as 
parameters to evaluate the constitutional-
ity of this transitional norm. Second, that 
the Court conceived the scope of the right 
to justice from judicial mechanism and not 
only from extra- judicial means. Third, that 
the Court adopted some international 
norms and jurisprudence as parameters to 
evaluate the constitutionality of the law. 
This applies particularly to the standards 
developed by the Inter- American Court 
of Human Rights about amnesties, as will 
be presented in the next chapter.    
2.4  Decision C-579 of 2013 and C-577 of 2014 
about the constitutionality of the “legal 
framework for peace”
According to article 241.1, the Constitu-
tional Court is competent to hear and 
judge about claims made to a Legislative 
Act or any other constitutional amend-
ment for flaws committed during the ap-
proval process. Although, according to its 
jurisprudence, procedural defects are not 
the only grounds to declare the uncon-
stitutionality of a constitutional reform. 
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Attending to a jurisprudence developed 
since 2003, the Court has held that the 
power to reform the Constitution has 
competence limits because attending to 
the words of article 374, the Constitution 
only could be “modified” by the consti-
tuted powers but not substituted. In this 
respect, the Court has stated that “to 
know if the power to reform incurred on a 
defect of competence, the constitutional 
judge shall analyze if the Constitution was 
or not substituted by other, and doing 
so, is needed to take into account the 
principles and values that the Constitu-
tion include and the ones that arise from 
the Constitutional Block” (Colombian 
Constitutional Court, 2003). 
Agreeing with this doctrine, new provi-
sional articles 66 and 67 of to the Con-
stitution, also knew as “legal framework 
for peace”, were revised by the Constitu-
tional Court under ultra vires charges. For 
the claimers, the amendment exceed the 
reform power of the Congress because 
those new provisions changed essential 
and structural elements that define the 
Colombian Constitution and therefore 
substitutes it for a new one. The Court 
on Decision C-579 of 2013, analyzed the 
constitutionality of the instruments of 
transitional justice that, on one hand, re-
strict the duty of the State to investigate, 
judge and punish all crimes committed by 
an armed group and focus it effort on the 
criminal investigation of crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes com-
mitted on a systematic way, and on the 
other hand, restrict the prosecution of 
criminal offences to the “most respon-
sible” ones. 
The claimers argued that those instruments 
substituted an essential element in the 
Constitution and the Constitutional 
Block, whereby that State has the 
commitment and duty to respect, protect, 
guarantee the rights of the community 
and victims, and therefore, assure the 
reparation, truth, no-repetition, but 
also, the investigation, prosecution and 
punishment for grave breaches to Human 
Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law. In this respect, the majority of the 
Court considered that balancing the rights 
to justice and to a long-lasting peace, 
those mechanisms do not suppose a 
substitution of the Constitution because, 
in first place, crimes against humanity, 
genocide and systematic war crimes will 
be in all cases investigated and punished, 
and second, the renounce of criminal 
prosecution for the other conducts is 
conditioned to demobilization, truth and 
reparation to the victims. 
Although the majority of the Court 
declared the constitutionality of the 
amendment for those charges, in ruling 
the Court fixed some parameters for due 
interpretation and statutory development 
of the provisions. Among others, the 
Court established that the criteria of 
“prioritization” and “selection” of the 
conducts subject to criminal prosecution 
must be transparent and participative 
with the victims, and also, that all, 
without no exceptions, crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes 
committed on a systematic matter must 
be investigated and punished through the 
most responsible offenders. 
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Later, on Decision C-577 of 2014, the 
Court revised other claim against provi-
sional article 67 of the Constitution. This 
time, the charge was that the provision did 
not prohibited that crimes like terrorism, 
drug trafficking, war crimes and other 
transnational felonies could be consid-
ered in the future as political crimes and 
therefore the offenders for those crimes 
could, eventually, participate in politics or 
be elected for a public office, substituting 
the democratic and participatory principle 
of the Constitution. For the majority of the 
Court, the provision that crimes against 
humanity, genocide or systematic war 
crimes will be the only constitutional 
restraint to conducts that cannot be con-
sidered as political crimes do not affect, 
on the contrary, guarantee the principle 
of participatory democracy for the demo-
bilized people. Some dissent justices of 
the majority decision, proposed in their 
dissent opinion that leaving behind the 
arguments on the claim, the Court must 
declared as unconstitutional the exclu-
sion of some conducts to be considered 
as political crimes in the future because 
this decision avoid permanently the politi-
cal rights of the people that committed 
it and that this provision restrict gravely 
the development of the current and future 
peace processes with armed groups. 
3.  THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS BINDING 
FOR COLOMBIA ABOUT TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
3.1 The “Constitutional Block” in the Colombian 
Constitution
According to article 93 of the Constitu-
tion, international treaties and agree-
ments ratified by the Congress that 
recognize human rights and that prohibit 
their limitation in states of emergency 
have priority domestically. Also, article 94 
states that the enunciation of the rights 
and guarantees contained in the Consti-
tution and in international agreements 
in effect should not be understood as 
a negation of others which are inherent 
to the human being and despite are not 
expressly mentioned in the Constitution.
From those norms, the Constitutional 
Court has developed the doctrine of the 
“Constitutional Block” (Colombian Con-
stitutional Court, 2008). To the Court, “[T]
he constitutional block consists of those 
international rules and principles, without 
formally appear in the articles of the Con-
stitution, are used as control parameters 
of the constitutionality of laws, because 
they have been normatively integrated 
into the Constitution, in various ways 
and mandate of the Constitution. They 
are true principles and rules of constitu-
tional value, that is, rules that are located 
at the constitutional level” (Colombian 
Constitutional Court, 1995). Therefore, 
for the Colombian constitutional law to 
make a systematic interpretation of any 
constitutional institution it is necessary 
to take into account the norms that be-
long to constitutional block (Colombian 
Constitutional Court, 2003A).
3.2 Universal System of Human Rights
Colombia ratified the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights [Here-
inafter ICCPR] with Act Number 74 of 
1968 and this norm has been recognized 
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as part of the Constitutional Block by 
the Constitutional Court (Colombian 
Constitutional Court, 2005B). Although 
the Covenant does not explicitly estab-
lish the duty of the States to investigate, 
prosecute and punish the violations of 
Human Rights, this obligation is based on 
article 2.3 of the ICCPR which establishes 
a duty of each State party “To ensure that 
any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognized are violated shall have 
an effective remedy, notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed 
by persons acting in an official capacity”. 
Hence, for the Human Rights Committee 
the failure of the State to investigate and 
to bring to justice the perpetrators of 
violations of human rights will be a breach 
of the ICCPR, especially when violations 
refer to the most serious crimes. Together 
with the Committee, other organs of the 
United Nations System had spoken in the 
same sense. As an example, the General 
Assembly has held since the Resolution 
2583 (XXIV) of 1969 that the investiga-
tion and punishment of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity “constitute an 
important element in the prevention of 
such crimes, the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms” (United 
Nations, General Assembly, 1969). 
Also, the Universal System of Human 
Rights has been working since 1988 with 
the specific purpose to create a set of 
principles and guidelines on the right to 
a remedy and reparation for victims of 
gross violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law, which will be 
binding for all State party. As part of this 
project, different drafts were entrusted to 
prominent international jurists. In 1997, 
the Professor Luis Joinet filed a final re-
port to the Commission of Human Rights 
which has become a relevant criterion 
of soft law about this matter (United Na-
tions, Economic and Social Council,1997). 
According to the report, the rights to 
the victims are: to know, to justice, to 
reparation and other measures aimed 
at guaranteeing the non- recurrence 
of violations. 
About the issues of conceding amnesties 
and how they affect the right to justice 
of the victim, some organs of United Na-
tions System have referred to this issue 
and although these statements are not 
binding, they might be considered as rel-
evant on the international trends.  In this 
sense, the Secretary-General, in address-
ing the Security Council in 2004, recom-
mended that should be “Reject[ed] any 
endorsement of amnesty for genocide, 
war crimes, or crimes against humanity, 
including those relating to ethnic, gender 
and sexually based international crimes, 
ensure that no such amnesty previously 
granted is a bar to prosecution before any 
United Nations-created or assisted court” 
(United Nations, Security Council, 2004). 
Also, the General Assembly by the Resolu-
tion 60/147 of 2006, approved the Basis 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
a Remedy and reparations of Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human, 
and stated in this regard, “Statutes of 
limitations shall not apply to gross viola-
tions of international human rights law 
and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law which constitute crimes 
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under international law” (United Nations, 
General Assembly, 2006).
In Consequence from the Universal 
System of Human Rights, the ICCPR on 
article 2.3 includes the right to an effec-
tive remedy. This right implies the duty 
of each State party to guarantee that the 
claims for violations to human rights must 
be investigated and prosecuted effectively 
by independent and impartial authorities, 
and consequently that the perpetrators 
must be brought to judicial authorities. 
Therefore, a State will be breaching the 
Covenant when it does not investigate, 
prosecute, punish or repair the victims 
of a violation of human rights. 
3.3 Inter-American System of Human Rights
Colombia ratified the Inter- American 
Convention of Human Rights with the 
Act Number 16 of 1972 and this norm has 
been recognized as part of the Constitu-
tional Block by the Constitutional Court. 
Under the Convention, State parties have 
the obligation to provide effective judi-
cial remedies to victims of human rights 
violations (Art. 25), remedies that must 
be substantiated in accordance with the 
rules of due process of law (Art. 8 (1)), all 
in keeping with the general obligation of 
such States to guarantee the free and full 
exercise of the rights recognized by the 
Convention to all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction (Art. 1) (Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, 1988).
The Convention also established the Inter- 
American Court as a jurisdictional organ 
and the authorized interpreter of the 
Convention. In this role, the Court calls 
access to justice a peremptory norm of 
international law. About the right to inves-
tigate and punish as a component of the 
right to justice, the Court has held even 
in the context of gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that the state 
has the duty to avoid and fight impunity, 
characterized as “an offence within the 
obligation to investigate, persecute, 
capture, prosecute, and sentence those 
responsible for violations of the rights 
protected by the American Convention” 
(Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
2006B).
Further, the Court addressed in several 
opportunities the issue of transitional jus-
tice and particularly the compatibility of 
the Convention with amnesties laws that 
impeded the investigation and punish-
ment of those responsible for atrocities. 
The first remarkable case was in 2001, 
when the Court in the judgment known as 
Barrios Altos v. Peru, decided, “amnesty 
provisions, the statute of limitation provi-
sions, and the establishment of exclusions 
of responsibility that are intended to pre-
vent the investigation and punishment of 
those responsible for serious violations to 
human rights such as torture, summary, 
extrajudicial, or arbitrary executions, and 
enforced disappearance are not admis-
sible under the Inter- American Conven-
tion of Human Rights” (Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, 2001) In 2006, the 
Court decided in the same way in the case 
called Almonacid- Arellano v. Chile, where 
the Court decided “that the States cannot 
neglect their duty to investigate, identify, 
and punish those persons responsible 
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for crimes against humanity by enforcing 
amnesty laws or any other similar domes-
tic provisions” (Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 2006B).
Recently, the Court has reaffirmed its po-
sition in two more cases. The first was in 
the case of Gomez Lund v Brazil in 2010 
with the Court reaffirming, “The non-
compatibility of the amnesty laws with the 
American Convention in cases of serious 
violations of human rights does not stem 
from a formal question, such as its origin, 
but rather from the material aspect as they 
breach the rights enshrined in Articles 8 
and 25, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of 
the Convention” (Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 2010). In the second and 
most recent case, the Court maintained 
the same position deciding that even “The 
fact that the Expiry Law [which, for all 
purposes constitutes an amnesty law] of 
the State has been approved in a demo-
cratic regime and yet ratified or supported 
by the public, on two occasions, namely, 
through the exercise of direct democracy, 
does not automatically or by itself grant 
legitimacy under International Law” and 
again struck down the law as contrary to 
the Inter- American Convention of Human 
Rights (Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, 2011).
Therefore, in the Inter- American System 
of Human Rights, the rights to an effec-
tive judicial remedy includes the duty by 
the State party to investigate, prosecute 
and punish those responsible for human 
rights violations even in the context of 
mass and systematic human rights viola-
tions. According to the Inter- American 
Court, this duty is reinforced when the 
conducts committed constitute crimes 
against humanity, genocide, torture or 
forced disappearance because in those 
cases any legal or factual obstacle for the 
investigation, prosecute and punishment 
is contrary to the Convention. 
CONCLUSIONS
The transitional measures that will be 
implemented to overcome the situation 
of armed conflict must not only respond 
to the political convenience. While the 
Constitution remain in force and unmodi-
fied, those measures must also be con-
sistent with the Constitution to be legal 
and legitimate. During the ongoing peace 
negotiations, one of the most complex 
issues will be the judicial accountability 
for human rights abuses committed by the 
parties in the context of the armed con-
flict. This issue implied serious constitu-
tional aspects like the rights involved and 
the constitutional mechanism provided in 
the Constitution to address this situation. 
Therefore, to understand the constitution-
al framework around that issue and how 
this framework affects the interpretation 
of the constitutional institution is not only 
convenient but also necessary during the 
current peace negotiation process. 
About the rights involved, on the one 
hand, the Colombian Constitution pro-
vides the value of peace. This constitu-
tional value is regulated on the Constitu-
tion as a collective right, a subjective right, 
and a duty to all institution and citizens. In 
this sense, the value of peace coexistence 
must be understood as a national purpose 
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and thus shall irradiate the Colombian 
legal system and the public institutions in 
their actions. On the other hand, the Con-
stitution also states the right of access to 
justice. This right acquires a precise con-
tent when any citizen becomes a victim of 
any illegal conduct. In this situation, the 
State has the duty, through the General 
Attorney office, to guarantee all the rights 
to redress the damage caused, including 
the investigation, prosecution and pun-
ishment of those responsible. According 
to the constitutional jurisprudence, the 
right to justice has to be reinforced in rela-
tion to the victims of the armed conflict in 
Colombia due to the vulnerability of this 
group of citizens.
The conflict between the right to peace 
and to justice in a transitional process 
was predicted by the Constitution. The 
Constitution establishes three different 
institutional arrangements to deal with 
this tension. First, the Constitution grants 
the Congress the power to enact amnesty 
laws for political crimes with a qualified 
majority and only for “public convenience” 
reasons. Second, the government has the 
power to concede executive pardons for 
political crimes. Third, the Constitution 
provides the possibility to regulate in a 
context of transitional justice the criteria 
of prioritization and selection for the 
crimes that will be investigated, prosecut-
ed and punished by the judicial system. 
Each of these transitional mechanisms 
must be interpreted in a systematic sense 
with the whole content of the Constitu-
tion. The meaning and scope of those 
mechanisms must be harmonized with the 
constitutional rights involved, seeking for 
the less restrictive interpretation. In this 
sense, the right to justice for the victims, 
understood as the duty of the State to 
investigate, prosecute and punish, could 
be affected in different levels by each 
mechanism. First, an amnesty law may 
assume the complete suppression of the 
right to justice for the crimes subject to 
the amnesty because this measure im-
pedes any judicial process from the begin-
ning. Second, a pardon measure ordered 
by the President, could supposes a less 
restrictive impact in the right to justice, 
because the execution of the condemned 
will be the only part affected. Third, in the 
case of the “legal framework for peace”, 
the impact of the right to justice would 
be equally severe than in an amnesty for 
the crimes non-prioritized or un-selected. 
The Colombian Constitutional Court in 
previous rulings has created some rele-
vant criteria for the interpretation of those 
mechanisms. First, the Court has adopted 
a criterion based on the rights involved 
in each mechanism and has established 
that even in the application of transitional 
measures like amnesties, the rights of 
the victims, including the right to justice, 
must be respected. Second, the Court 
has established that the international law 
binding for Colombia is another explicit 
limit to the transitional measures because 
in virtue of the “Constitutional Block” they 
make it an active part of the Constitution. 
In this sense, (i) the obligation of the State 
to investigate, prosecute and punish the 
perpetrators of the crimes enlisted on the 
ICC Statute, (ii) the mandate by the Univer-
sal System of Human Rights to prosecute 
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and punish the international crimes, and 
(iii) the prohibition suggested by the Inter- 
American Court to concede amnesties for 
the most serious human rights violations, 
are constitutional parameters that must 
be considered for the implementation of 
the transitional mechanisms included in 
the Colombian Constitution. 
In consequence, the combination of the 
constitutional dispositions, the constitu-
tional rights involved, the distribution of 
powers and the constitutional parameters 
of interpretation presented above con-
stitute the Constitutional Framework for 
transitional justice in Colombia. Therefore, 
it is within this framework that political 
powers must adopt the transitional de-
cisions to guarantee their legality and 
legitimacy, unless the peace process 
includes a constituent exercise, in which 
case the constitutional framework itself 
will be uncertain. 
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